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Video clips - The Limits of Science (myself in conversation with Rupert Sheldrake and James Le Fanu)

The videos are here.


Comments

daz365 said…
Le Fanu walks around in a complete haze being baffled by everything he sees but is unable to articulate it and Sheldrake is completely deluded. Mind you I may be blinded by my materialism ;)
March 9, 2013 at 8:05 PM
DKNIGHT said…
This comment has been removed by the author.
March 10, 2013 at 1:24 PM
Unknown said…
So James Le Fanu can't imagine a way that science can answer certain complicated questions, therefore science can't answer certain complicated questions - "it just can't". QED.
March 10, 2013 at 11:06 PM
DKNIGHT said…
Le Fanu's line of argument is amazingly egotistical and basically amounts to saying that his own limits of understanding is also the limits of science, not only now but forever.
March 11, 2013 at 12:08 AM
Anonymous said…
Dr. Law,

I found the argument that you sketched out about pain and the absurdity of someone feeling like they were in screaming pain when they were actually not in pain at all to be interesting.

But do you think that referred pain, which is just the process by which you brain incorrectly projects pain to the wrong area of the body, could be a counter-factual to this argument? For example, if a man has a heart attack he will feel a burning pain in his left shoulder, but his left shoulder really isn't in any pain at all.
March 14, 2013 at 5:34 AM
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